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In his ground-breaking article, Tiebout proposed a novel 
solution to the free-rider problem. Because public goods are 
non-excludable, the rational citizen "will understate his 
preferences and hope to enjoy the goods while avoiding the tax" 
(Tiebout 1956, p. 417). Tiebout's solution applies to those 
public goods that are excludable beyond the boundaries of the 
local jurisdiction, although non-excludable within the 
jurisdi�tion. If Ms. Doe has a choice of many jurisdictions in 
a metropolitan area, she will be forced to reveal her true 
preferences for the public good by residing in that jurisdiction 
which has service levels closest to her own tastes. 
Spatial mobility provides the local public-goods counter-
part to the private market's shopping trip • • . •  If 
consumer-voters are fully mobile, the appropriate local 
governments, whose revenue-expenditure patterns are set, 
are adopted by the consumer-voters. While the solution may 
not be perfect because of institutional rigidities, this does 
not invalidate its importance. [Tiebout 1956, pp. 422, 424]
It is difficult to see how providing individuals i 
I range of choice with respect to service-providing jurisdict�ons 
I could do anything but help (or at least not hurt) everyone.I Bu 
I , somehow, it seems, some individuals are made worse off when the 
shift is made from consolidated to local government. Asl Wallac 
Oates has written: 
Once we recognize that the demand for public servicis lis 
systematically related to income, we see that the liefuout 
model implies powerful tendencies toward segregatiln �y 
income level. • • • The change from .the typical. plewar 
situation, in which most metropolitan residents livedl in 
central cities, to the postwar situation, in which[mapy 
high-income residents live in exclusionary suburbsJ has 
tended to deprive the poor of most of the redistriJut�ve .. 
benefits accruing to the poor, while conferring beteffts 1 
upper-income households both in terms of reduced traJsfer 
through the local public sector and an enhanced effi�ienc 
in the local services they consume. [Mills and oales 197 
pp. 5, 9] 
The observation that fragmentation is biased towards I 
middle and upper income groups is developed theoretical�yland 
empirically by Hill (1974), Danielson (1976), Markusen 1(1�74), 
G. Miller (1977) and S. Miller and Tabb (1973). The tHem 
ehm artkle. '' the •=e " Oate. • ' the ,.paratioo ,, 
classes into different jurisdictions deprives lower-in�om 
of 
n
:::1
3of the resources that concentrate in upper-income jurisdictions. 
The result is a 
.spatially differentiated metropolis in which blacks 
are separated from whites, the poor from the more affluent, 
the disadvantaged from economic and educational opportunity, 
and local jurisdictions with the greatest public needs from 
communities which possess the greatest share of the public 
resources. [Danielson 1976, p. l] 
Thus, there seems to be an inescapable conflict between 
one group of individuals who maintain that multiple local 
governments are necessary for allocational efficiency, and another 
group who maintain that fragmentation of local government 
necessarily leads to an inequitable allocation of resources among 
income classes. 
It is the purpose of this note to clarify, if not 
resolve this conflict by pointing out that the allocational 
advantages of metropolitan fragmentation derive from one function 
of local government, while the redistributional disadvantages 
derive largely from a different function. It is theoretically 
possible, therefore, to have a just and efficient organization of 
metropolitan government by centralizing one function of local 
government. 
THE DISTRIBUTION OF REVENUE IN A FRAGMENTED METROPOLIS 
Historically, one of the functions performed by local 
government has been the raising of revenue from a set of resources 
that are in some sense "located" within the boundaries of the 
I , individual jurisdiction, and to which a kind of "property r�ght" 
has been assigned by a higher level of government. Thislsy�tem 
of revenue allocation is in contrast to other feasible revemue-
allocation systems in which (for instance) revenue is raised 
directly by the higher level of government and allocatedla�ong 
the lower-level local governments. 
One of the consequences of this decentralized il.o, 
control of revenue resources has been what Warren has ca!ll! 
"scramble for resources" (1958). There has been intensl 
al 
d th 
olit 
conflict among local governments for the retail shopper ,I fdJr 
industry, and for high-income residences. There has been1an 
equally intense effort to exclude low-income or resourcJ­
draining residents through slum removal, selective ann�at on 
residential developments, and zoning. 
1
In Los Angeles, for instance, the conflict over tesoU:tllil:S 
was most obvious during the period of intense annexatioJ ahd 
incorporation from 1954 to 1964, in which over 240 squale lniles 
of land, worth literally billions of dollars was foughtlo�er. 
contemporary wrote: 
Owners and developers, actual and potential, of thts,lvast 
deposit of natural wealth are locked in a tug-of-war Ito r 
zone or unzone, to annex or incorporate with the bks':i!c ai: 
of gaining control of land and hence land values. I [Cluote, 
in Pavlovskis 1973, p. 26]
5As middle-class and upper-class individuals flocked to the newly 
created Lakewood Plan cities with their low tax rates, they drew 
many of the most desirable revenue resources with them. With the 
high-income residential developments went the lucrative regional 
shopping malls, the central offices for many large firms, and the 
desirable industry. On the other hand, many old-line cities 
became increasingly low-income in population and often experienced 
an actual decline in revenue resources. Hence the redistributional 
problem noted earlier: the jurisdictions with the most intense 
urban problems increasingly have the fewest resources to deal with 
them. 
While the redi�tributional problem associated with 
fragmentation is related to a particular means of distributing 
revenue, the advantages of metropolitan fragmentation identified 
by Tiebout are independent of the means of distributing revenue 
among local governments, and depend only on local control of 
consumption decisions. For instance, imagine a system in which 
some metropolitan level of government (let us say the county) is 
responsible for setting tax rates, seeking state and federal 
grants, and in general raising revenue which they then distribute 
to local governments directly. Local governments would retain· 
perfect autonomy over how that revenue will be used, but not over 
the size of the budget. The budget can be spent on a variety of 
local services or it can even be distributed among the members of 
the municipality in the form of a rebate. Such a system of 
metropolitan fragmentation would allow just as much individual 
revelation of preferences and allocational efficiency as one in  which the local governments retained control of the revenug-
raising function. An individual could still choose amojg those 
municipalities for that pattern of expenditure that besJ suite' 
his or her own preferences. 
In fact, it is my contention that the efficiency, bene"Wts 
of fragmentation would be more operative in a system whlr� revJ 
was equitably distributed by a central agency than in t�e,�res 
decentralized system. In the present system, one of thl Tdain 
reasons why an individual might choose one municipalitylcr\ 
another is the resource advantage: in El Segundo, an· indtilvidu 
I , can get better services in all categories for a lower tax. lpric 
I than in neighboring Compton because of the differences in 
resources in the two cities. This resource advantage chulld 
I , easily swamp any preferences the individual has over reiatlive 
mixes of public services in the two cities. 
To see this, let us imagine a situation in wh1cli the 
is one public good and one private good. The public good IQ is 
provided by any of a series of local jurisdictions. Thl :tndiv 
, I budget (Yi) goes towards his tax on the public good and t ward 
consumption of the private good. His tax share is given , y th 
proportion of property that he owns divided by the totJ1:prope 
in the jurisdiction. 
Yi p Z + (H./ E H.)p QJNJ Z 1 iEJ 1 q 
where 
al's 
pz = price of the private good Z 
p = price of the public good Q (assumed constant q 
throughout the metropolitan area) 
7
Hi = the property for which the individual z is taxed 
QJ = the amount of public good per capita in 
jurisdiction J 
NJ = the population of jurisdiction J 
The slope of the individual's budget constraint in a 
given municipality is given by 
s 
=
 
(Hi/.EJ
Hi)QJNJ (pq/pz). 
ie 
Now suppose the individual is considering purchasing a home in two 
different municipalities, say Santa Fe Springs and Maywood in Los 
Angeles County. The municipalities are close together, they have 
similar populations, and the homes he is looking at are similarly 
priced. The difference is that Santa Fe Springs has roughly nine 
times the taxable property per capita, and provides QS of the 
public good, while Maywood provides the smaller level QM. Because 
his budget constraint would be different in the two cities, his 
preferences for the public good would also be different. The 
flatter budget constraint in Santa Fe Springs acts as a price 
decrease, so he prefers Q� in that city, and Q� in Maywood. Now 
let us suppose that Q� is equal to the actual level of provision 
of the public good in Maywood {QM). He endures no conformity cost 
whatsoever in that municipality. He does in fact endure � larg 
confo=Hy coa' in San'a Fe Springa, reprea�'ed by ehe l d�ffertoe 
between UII and UIII. But he will choose to live in that' 
municipality which does not match his preferences rathek 'tlhan 
one which does, because u11 > u1. It is difficult to slEilhow 
Tiebout efficiency effect is operative in this case, sild 
discrepancies in resources force the individual to revek:I!ta 
preference for governmental output far removed from hisl trtue 
preferences. What he does reveal is a taste for resource4rich 
communities over poor ones, a taste that is probably shki4d by 
great many people. (See Figure 1. ) 
tll 
ti 
evenu On the other hand, if the county were to raise 
by means of a uniform levy and then distribute the reve�� in ��<lb 
 a way that Maywood could still afford to provide QM andl Santa Fi 
Springs QS, then the individual could choose between the •1wo 
governments on the basis of his preferences for the two! 1 vels 
of public goods, as assumed by Tiebout. 
The argument being made here is that by divorci g two 
func,iona of local g�e��'• and aaaigning �e level �o co��
government or higher, Tiebout's efficiency argument wou!ld obta�E 
�re perfec,ly. I �uld like '" no'e ''a' 'here ia a �· eden!
for this kind of argument. At one time, city-county con� lidal 
criticized metropolitan fragmentation on the grounds tJati smalJ I • 111 governments could not realize economies of scale in the � ovis[� 
of municipal services, and therefore could not be effiJi�nt. 
Vincent Ostrom quite accurately pointed to the fallacy linl this 
"nists 
ocal 
z 
QM"' 
Q* M 
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The Effect of Different Budget Constraints 
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argument, which is that small governments must necessar�1 
themselves with municipal services by means of their ol , 
bureaucratic agencies (1961). As Ostrom points out, smll 
governments, acting as collective consumption units, ca,l , 
with the county or any other producer for any services lfo 
the benefits of large scale obtain. Ostrom made this arg 
conceptually clarifying the difference between local gJve 
as collective consumption unit and as service producer. 
The analogy with my argument is close. Just las 
local governments can divest themselves (or be divested 6 
responsibility of actually providing municipal serviceJ, I ,also be divested of the responsibility of translating nes 
in'o r�•�••· "'''"• aa �11 collec,ive c�ump,ion lme 
local governments can take a budget handed to them by a c 
governmental level, make decisions about what services Ito 
that budget on, and procure those services by contracting 
agency of that higher governmental level or some other lpr 
The benefits of fragmentation described would still hold� 
I At this point, two objections might be raised t 
argument in this note. The first is that the centralijat I the revenue function is already occurring gradually, due; 
increased importance of state and federal grants, reveJue 
and the property tax revolt, which undercuts the resoulce 
supp, 
;mall� 
loci 
o
::]� 
m�'I nmen.·
I smala 
) th� 
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urce. 
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J, 
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on J 
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has historically been the foundation of local autonomy lover t 
revenue function. To the extent that this is true, the a�gume 
in my paper should reassure those proponents of local lut nomJ,111111110 
rely on Tiebout for theoretical support: if revenue comes from 
the central government without strings attached, the Tiebout 
argument still applies. On the other hand, in the aftermath of 
the property tax revolt in California, the state government of 
California used its surplus to aid local government with 
conditions on how it should be spent and with the intent of re-
11 
imbursing municipalities for lost property tax revenue. California's 
solution was thus the worst of both worlds: it failed to address 
the question of redistributional equity while limiting local 
autonomy over the collective consumption function. 
A second objection that could be made is that the 
solution proposed is not politically viable. For county or state 
governments to undertake to distribute revenue to local govern-
ments flies in the face of entrenched political forces who benefit 
from local autonomy over revenue resources. Further, even if a 
central government were to undertake the function of revenue 
raising and distribution among local governments, there is no 
guarantee that this centralized revenue distribution would be 
more equitable than the old system of "squatter sovereignty. " 
With this point I am in basic agreement. I do believe 
that, with certain institutional safeguards to improve the political 
position of low-income groups in society, a centralized resource-
allocation function could hardly do worse than the present system. 
However, absent such institutional safeguards, the distribution of 
revenue among local governments would be a pure redistributional 
issue; such an issue would be sure to be subject to the Arrow 
12 
paradox, and virtually any redistribution of resources 
theoretically possible (Ward 1961). 
But the primary purpose of this paper was not, 
the equity problems that have been associated with mekrb
fragmentation, but to point out that a solution is thlo1 
feasible within the context of metropolitan fragmentakioln andllllltlhe 
 Tiebout argument. This was undertaken first by pointing) out llliiltte 
conceptual distinction between local governments as col: 
I consumption units and local governments as "owners" of 
I bearing resources. As long as it is assumed that Tiebout's 
argument requires the second function as well as the fi�st, 
I that argument will be misused to defend the present distiribub�dn 
of resources in the name of "efficiency. " 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Danielson, Michael H. The Politics of Exclusion. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1976.
Hill, Richard Child. "Separate and Unequal: Governmental 
Inequality in the Metropolis." American Political 
Science Review 68 (1974):1557-1568.
Markusen, Ann R. "The Economics of Social Class." Papers and 
Proceedings, National Tax Association (1974).
Miller, Gary. "Is the Invisible Hand Biased?" Social Science 
Working Paper No. 160, California Institute of 
Technology, April 1977.
Miller, Stephen M. and Tabb, William K. "A New Look at a Pure 
Theory of Local Expenditures." National Tax Journal 25
(1973):161-176.
Mills, Edwin S. and Oates, Wallace. Fiscal Zoning and Land Use 
Controls. Lexington, D. C.: Heath and Company, 1975.
Ostrom, Vincent; Tiebout, Charles M.; and Warren, Robert:J "TI 
I , Organization of Government in Metropolitan Are�s: i 
I ! Theoretical Inquiry." The American Politica!l '�cienc 
Review 55 (December, 1961):831-842.
Pavlovskis, Valdis. The Economic and Fiscal Im act of[ t e Ci1 
. . I · i ,4fi1 d of Industry on the Surrounding Communities. Un ublis,1:1,<:;! 
I thesis, California State Polytechnic Universfi.t;J1, 
Pomona, 1973.
Tiebout, Charles. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditure's.fl• 
Journal of Political Economy 64 (October, 19156 :416
Ward, Benjamin. "Majority Rule and Allocation." Jourl:iat of
Conflict Resolution 5 (1961):379-389.
I 
4
